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Constitutional Law-DRUG TESTING OF FLORIDA'S PUBLIC
EMPLOYEES: WHEN MAY A PUBLIC EMPLOYER REQUIRE URINALYSIS?-
City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (5th DCA 1985)
D RUG abuse has been discussed increasingly in the last few
years, and has commanded significant media and legal atten-
tion.1 The health effects of drug abuse on drug users are well
known. Many recent court decisions, however, have focused on the
damage and danger to others caused by employees who use drugs
on and off the job."
Recent studies trace staggering amounts of damage to drug using
employees. The Research Triangle Institute reported that drug
abuse drained the United States economy of approximately
$60,000,000,000 in 1983, up thirty percent from 1980.1 Other stud-
ies have indicated that drug users are more likely to steal from
their employers, miss over ten times as many workdays, and per-
form less productively than nonusers."
More importantly, drug abusers injure themselves and others
three times more than do nonusers.5 This tendency has frightening
implications when drug users are employed as police officers, mass
transit operators, air traffic controllers, and in other positions
where human error can have catastrophic results. For example,
since 1975, workers impaired by drug or alcohol use have caused
nearly fifty train accidents, resulting in thirty-seven deaths and
eighty injuries, along with $34,000,000 in property damage.6 These
figures were released before the Conrail-Amtrak train collision
which occurred in January 1987. That accident killed sixteen peo-
ple and injured 175 others. Both the Conrail engineer and brake-
1. Human Performance, TIME, Jan. 26, 1987, at 23; Questions from a Wreck, TIME, Jan.
19, 1987, at 25; Tomorrow, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 19, 1987, at 28; Drug Testing:
The New Inquisition, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 71; Battiata, Drug Tests: The Pros & Cons,
Washington Post, May 5, 1986, at B8, col. 5; Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME,
Mar. 17, 1986, at 52, 53.
2. McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1984), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th
Cir. 1987); Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga. 1986); Lovvorn v. City of Chat-
tanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Capua v. City of Plainsfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986); Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
3. H. HARWOOD, D. NAPOLITANO, P. KRISTIANSEN, J. COLLINS, ECONOMIC COSTS TO SOCIETY
OF ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE AND MENTAL ILLNESS: 1980, at 3, G-16 (Research Triangle
Institute June 1984)[hereinafter RTI report].
4. Castro, Battling the Enemy Within, TIME, March 17, 1986, at 52, 53.
5. Id. at 53.
6. Id.
102 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:101
man were found to have marijuana in their systems at the time of
the mishap.7
Understandably, private and governmental employers have
taken steps to reduce employee drug use. One-fourth of the FOR-
TUNE 500 companies now screen employees for drugs. Employers
have used undercover agents, lie detector tests, blood tests, and
searches ranging from pat-downs to body cavity searches. Com-
pelled urinalysis currently is a widely used method of drug use de-
tection.8 Many private employers have introduced urinalysis as
part of regular physical examinations and have conducted unan-
nounced inspections of randomly selected employees with startling
results.' Because of mass testing, the threat of being detected and
consequently losing one's job is real, and provides a greater deter-
rent to drug usage than the more remote chance of criminal
penalties. 10
While employers have been pleased with the results of drug test-
ing, employees predictably have been disturbed. The EMIT (En-
zyme Multiplied Immunossay Technique) test is a simple, inexpen-
sive urinalysis testing procedure which can be administered by
nontechnical personnel." Unfortunately, the EMIT test measures
only the presence of marijuana in the system, and does not reveal
intoxication or time of use. Thus, it is impossible for an EMIT test
to reveal whether use occurred on or off the job, or if the user was
ever actually drug-impaired.
1 2
7. Human Performance, TIME, January 26, 1987, at 23; Questions from a Wreck, TIME,
January 19, 1987, at 25.
8. Tomorrow, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 19, 1987, at 28.
9. The Georgia Power Company reported that its accident rate decreased 90% from
1981, when testing was implemented, to 1985. Washington Post, May 5, 1986, at B8, col. 5.
Southern Pacific Railroad experienced a 71% decrease in accidents and injuries attributable
to human error after it implemented drug and alcohol screening. Putting Them All to the
Test, TIME, Oct. 21, 1985, at 61. Confidential surveys in the U.S. Armed Forces also show
dramatic declines in drug usage because testing is more frequent. Drug Testing: The New
Inquisition, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 71.
10. Drug Testing: The New Inquisition, TIME, Sept. 15, 1986, at 71. The private sector's
success in detecting drug use has prompted speculation that a concerted effort by private
employers could wipe out the drug problem by 1990. Schwed, Miami Attacks Drugs in Offi-
cial Circles: Common as the Coffee Break, PROPRIETARY TO UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL,
Dec. 1, 1985 (available on NEXIS). As part of his war on drugs, President Reagan issued an
executive order calling for each agency chief to establish random testing procedures for em-
ployees in "sensitive positions." N.Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1986, at Al, col. 1.
11. SYVA COMP., SYVA SYSTEMS AND SERVICES FOR ON-SITE DRUG DETENrrIoN (1983).
12. SYVA COMP., FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SYVA AND DRUG ABUSE TESTING 8
(1986). The manufacturer of the EMIT test, the Syva Company, reports that the test de-
tects drugs up to 19 days after use. Id. at 7.
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Several successful testing challenges have been brought by pub-
lic employees. 3 These employees have argued that urinalysis tests
are unreasonable searches and seizures banned by the fourth
amendment. Federal courts generally have allowed testing of cer-
tain public employees in safety-related jobs when there was a par-
ticularized suspicion that the employees were drug users. Some-
times called "reasonable suspicion," this particularized suspicion
has several formulations but is always less stringent a standard
than probable cause. Two recent federal circuit court of appeals
decisions would allow random testing,1 4 and some federal district
court decisions have implied that random testing would be allowed
if a drug problem were shown to exist among a certain group of
workers in safety-related jobs.15
City of Palm Bay v. Bauman6 is the leading Florida case on
public employee drug testing. In Bauman, the Fifth District Court
of Appeal held that random testing of municipal fire fighters and
police officers is improper, but that testing of those employees
would be permissible if the reasonable suspicion standard was
met. 7
Before the Bauman decision, several cities had experimented
with random testing of employees ranging from garbage collectors
and sewer department workers to police officers.1 8 Post-Bauman,
most Florida public employers likely will avoid random testing un-
til its legality is decided conclusively. Several Florida employers,
however, have interpreted Bauman to approve reasonable suspi-
cion testing for all public employees, not only those whose drug
use threatens public safety. The Florida Department of Law En-
forcement and several major Florida cities have adopted the rea-
sonable suspicion standard for all employees.' While this means
13. Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Jones v. Mc-
Kenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986); National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986); City of Palm Bay v. Bauman, 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1985).
14. Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 577
(1986); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
15. Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (D.D.C. 1986); Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at
882 (E.D. Tenn. 1986).
16. 475 So. 2d 1322 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).
17. Id. at 1325.
18. Schwed, supra note 10.
19. Telephone interview with Al Dennis, Special Agent, Florida Department of Law En-
forcement (Jan. 30, 1987). The Miami Police Department is a notable exception. The De-
partment reinstituted random, on-the-spot testing of all 1,087 of its officers this March. The
Miami Herald, March 24, 1987, at 1B, col. 6.
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that those employees are not subject to random testing, the blan-
ket imposition of testing based on reasonable suspicion com-
promises the right of thousands of state and municipal employees
such as clerical workers, secretaries and janitors to be free from
unreasonable searches. These employees would be treated the
same as armed police officers.
In this Note, the author analyzes City of Palm Bay v. Bauman
in conjunction with federal case law. He advocates adoption of the
reasonable suspicion standard for only those public employees
whose human error threatens public safety, and concludes by pro-
posing random testing by public employers who can show the exis-
tence of a drug problem among a specific, safety-threatening group
of public employees.
I. THE Bauman DECISION
In June of 1983, the Fire Chief of the City of Palm Bay ordered
all fire fighters to take annual physicals, including urine tests. The
physicals were prompted when two fire fighters told the Fire Chief
that they had used marijuana. The City later ordered that all fire
fighters submit to urine testing or be dismissed.2
In 1984, the Palm Bay City Manager and Chief of Police de-
clared that all members of the police department would be subject
to random urine tests. Those members who tested positive for "il-
legal substance" use would be subject to discipline or discharge.
Members who refused to give a sample could be fired or otherwise
disciplined. There apparently were no indications that any mem-
ber of the Palm Bay Police Department had actually used illegal
substances. Actions for declaratory and injunctive relief were
brought in Brevard County Circuit Court.2 1
Circuit Judge Johnson recognized that fire fighters and police of-
ficers must be in control of all their mental and physical faculties
on the job, and that public employees in general are subject to
more regulation than private sector employees. The court further
recognized that use of illegal substances by law enforcement of-
ficers undermines public confidence. On the other hand, Judge
Johnson noted that non-probationary municipal employees deserve
20. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1323-24.
21. Id. at 1322-23, 1327.
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constitutional protection from unjust and unlawful job
deprivation. 2
Judge Johnson decided the case under the fourth amendment of
the United States Constitution and the Florida parallel provision,
article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.23 Under the court's
analysis, citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
urine, and compelled urine tests constitute fourth amendment
searches and seizures. 24
The next question was whether the testing was unreasonable
when the private rights of the city workers were balanced against
the immediate end sought by the city, in light of the "scope, na-
ture, incidence and effect" of the testing. Since the city produced
no evidence of illegal substance use by most of the employees in-
volved, Judge Johnson decided that the testing was unreasonable;
he held that urine testing to identify illegal substance users, ad-
ministered other than at the annual physical examination or times
specified by city personnel policy, may be required only "on the
basis of probable cause." Judge Johnson defined "probable cause"
as "reasonable suspicion, supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious person in believing the
police officer or fire fighter to have been on the job using, or after
having recently used, a controlled substance. '25 Furthermore, the
city manager must designate persons authorized to require the
22. Id. at 1324 (citing Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So. 2d 187 (Fla.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 816 (1983)).
23. Id. at 1324-25. Because urine tests are not testimonial communications, the court
stated that the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution and
article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution, which prohibit compelled self-incrimination
in any criminal case, did not apply. Id. at 1324. See also Storms v. Coughlin, 600 F. Supp.
1214, 1217 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)(self-incrimination arguments by prisoners subjected to
urinalysis rejected).
One other possible challenge to employee drug testing should be noted. A Louisiana fed-
eral district court has held that drug testing is "so fraught with dangers of false positive
readings" as to violate due process rights. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
649 F. Supp. 380 (E.D. La. 1986); See Capua v. City of Plainsfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507
(D.N.J. 1986). The courts in Von Raab and Capua, however, also based their decisions on
fourth amendment concerns. Apparently no federal court yet has upheld a urinalysis chal-
lenge based solely on due process grounds. It appears doubtful that a plaintiff could success-
fully challenge urinalysis on due process grounds unless he also prevailed under the fourth
amendment.
24. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1324-25. The court pointed out that coerced production ren-
dered the written "consent" obtained by the city invalid. See also American Fed'n of Gov't
Employees, AFL-CIO v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986)(governments may not
condition employment on relinquishment of fourth amendment rights).
25. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1325.
1987]
106 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:101
tests. All other urine testing of police officers and fire fighters was
permanently enjoined.2 6
The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's final
judgment with two modifications. It described the circuit court's
probable cause requirement as "too severe," and replaced it with
the "reasonable suspicion" standard adopted by several federal
courts. In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard and
vindicate the use of urine testing, the official imposing the test
must "point to specific objective facts and rational inferences that
they are entitled to draw from these facts in light of their
experience. "27
Next, the court dispensed with a restriction allowing discipline
only for on-duty intoxication. The court held that the city could
prohibit controlled substances use at any time, either on or off the
job. In support of this modification, the court cited evidence that
the effects of marijuana use could be severe in both the long and
short term, depending on the individual user and the potency of
the marijuana. Further, the court reasoned that police officers lose
credibility when they violate the laws they are hired to enforce,
and should be disciplined for drug use whenever it occurs. 8
II. FEDERAL FOURTH AMENDMENT CASE LAW
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
tects people from unreasonable searches of things in which they
have a reasonable expectation of privacy and from unreasonable
searches of the person." The fourteenth amendment makes this
right applicable to the States.30 In determining whether drug test-
ing is permissible under the fourth amendment, a court must de-
cide whether the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation of privacy
26. Id.
27. Id. at 1325-26. Judge Orfinger, in the unanimous district court opinion, based his
acquiescence to the federal standard on article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution.
That section addresses searches and seizures, and provides that it "shall be construed in
conformity with the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court." FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
28. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1326.
29. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925). Amendment IV of the United
States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by an oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
30. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26-28 (1949).
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in the thing searched or seized and whether the intrusion was rea-
sonable. In order to make these determinations, the interests of the
public must be weighed against the individual's privacy interest. 1
A. Is There a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Urine?
The Bauman trial court, affirmed by the Fifth District Court of
Appeal and supported by most federal case law, found that all citi-
zens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the discharge and
disposition of their urine.82 More than one federal court has con-
cluded, however, that reasonable expectations of privacy may vary
among people, and that all people do not enjoy the same degree of
fourth amendment protection.3
The United States Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their urine.
However, in Schmerber v. California,4 the Court held that since
blood samples taken from a drunken driving suspect for chemical
analysis constitute a fourth amendment search and seizure, only
reasonable takings would be allowed. 8
Several federal courts have cited Schmerber in deciding that
persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their urine. In
McDonell v. Hunter," the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa recognized that urine, unlike blood, can be taken
without intrusion into the body. However, the court stressed that
people ordinarily urinate under circumstances where they have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and that they certainly do not
expect to have to surrender urine for testing.3 7 The McDonell court
also recognized that urine tests reveal personal information that
has nothing to do with recent drug usage. Accordingly, the McDon-
ell court concluded that governmental urine testing is a fourth
31. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967); Division 241 Amalgamated
Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
32. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1324.
33. See Suscy, 538 F.2d at 1267, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Committee for GI
Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th
Cir. 1987).
34. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
35. Id. at 767.
36. 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1985), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
37. Id. at 1127-28.
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amendment seizure, subject to the Schmerber reasonableness
requirement.3
In Storms v. Coughlin,39 another federal district court relied on
Schmerber and asserted that "involuntary extraction of body
fluids" made urine tests a bodily intrusion as defined in Schmer-
ber. The court in Storms differentiated blood and urine tests from
"traditional searches of clothing or possessions" and quoted
Schmerber in holding that "[tihe interests in human dignity and
privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects forbid [searches in-
volving intrusions beyond the body's surface] on the mere chance
that desired evidence might be obtained. '4 0
While most courts have concluded that urine testing constitutes
a fourth amendment search and seizure, some federal cases seem to
hold that persons in certain occupations have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy, or have at most a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy. 1 One could argue, however, that those courts really balanced
the expectation of privacy all citizens have against the increased
governmental interests in certain generally safety related situa-
tions. Since this involves essentially the same balancing analysis
used to determine whether a particular seizure of urine was reason-
able in light of governmental interests and the privacy expectation
of the individual, both types of cases will be considered in the next
section.
B. When is Testing Reasonable?
Given that citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their urine, a court must decide whether the seizure of urine was
38. Id. See also Capua v. City of Plainsfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.N.J. 1986) (em-
ployers have no legitimate interest in access to some revelations of urinalysis, such as
whether subject has diabetes or epilepsy).
39. 600 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
40. Id. at 1218 (quoting Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 769-70). Indeed, most recent decisions
have echoed the McDonell district court's application of Schmerber to urine testing. See
Allen v. City of Marietta, 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985); National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab, 55 U.S.L.W. 2284 (E.D. La. 1986); Capua, 643 F. Supp. at 1507. Rail-
way Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Long Island R.R. Co., 651 F. Supp. 1284 (E.D.N.Y. 1987);
American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga.
1986). See also McDonell, 809 F.2d at 1302 (urine tests are less intrusive than blood tests,
but still constitute fourth amendment searches and seizures). But see Turner v. Fraternal
Order of Police, 500 A.2d 1005, 1009 (D.C. 1985) (Nebeker, Assoc. J., concurring).
41. See Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264, 1267 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466,
477 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Compare McDonel, 809 F.2d 1302 (prison employees in regular con-
tact with inmates have diminished privacy interest in their urine).
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reasonable under the circumstances. This is determined by balanc-
ing the claimant's fourth amendment rights against the govern-
mental interest served by urinalysis testing. With a few limited ex-
ceptions, searches of private property or persons without consent
are deemed unreasonable without a valid warrant.4 2 Federal courts
generally have held urinalysis unreasonable in the absence of prob-
able cause unless the government shows a safety interest served by
testing. When a safety interest exists, courts have relaxed the gov-
ernment's burden of affirmatively demonstrating that drugs likely
will be found, and sometimes have allowed random testing.
The first case involving urine testing of government employees
was Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy.4 3 The
plaintiff in Suscy was a union representing bus operators employed
by the Chicago Transit Authority. The Authority required its oper-
ators to submit urine samples if they had been involved in "seri-
ous" accidents or if they were suspected of being under the influ-
ence of drugs or alcohol while on duty. No testing could be
required under either event unless two supervisors agreed it was
necessary."
The Seventh Circuit held that the Authority's interest in pro-
tecting bus patrons and the public at large was sufficient to deprive
members of the union of any reasonable expectation of privacy re-
garding blood and urine testing. The opinion followed this une-
quivocal statement by pointing out the reasonableness of the Au-
thority's policy proscribing testing absent prior accident or
suspicion of use. 5
The court in Suscy approved the Chicago Transit Authority's
urinalysis procedures, but exactly what else the Seventh Circuit
would have allowed is unclear. If the court really meant that bus
operators had no reasonable expectation of privacy, then random
testing of all operators would have been permissible. However, if
the court was saying that the operators' expectation of privacy was
outweighed by the combination of the government's safety interest
and the reasonableness of procedures for determining who would
be required to take the tests, then random testing might not have
been allowed.
42. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 430 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971).
43. 538 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
44. Id. at 1267.
45. Id.
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The district court opinion in McDonell v. Hunter46 fairly repre-
sents the majority of the current federal law on public employee
urinalysis. The plaintiff, an Iowa prison correctional officer, refused
to submit a urine sample requested by his superiors. The Iowa
Corrections Department had no written standards detailing when
prison employees could be compelled to provide urine samples or
who had authority to require samples. The Director and Chief Ad-
ministrator of the Department of Corrections stated that urine
samples were not requested as a practical matter unless there was
"some articulable reason to believe that there may be a prob-
lem. '47 Provisions permitting random strip searches and automo-
bile searches were also challenged.48
After deciding that urinalysis was an intrusion into an area
where plaintiff normally had a reasonable expectation of privacy,
the district court recognized the state's interest in reducing the
flow of contraband in the prison system and noted that the need
for security justified some otherwise unreasonable intrusions. Se-
curity considerations did not, however, cause prison employees to
"lose all of their fourth amendment rights at the prison gates."49
The court found that the government's interest in security was
sufficient to allow the use of pat-down searches or metal detector
tests of all employees, but that the possibility of finding drugs was
"far too attenuated to make seizures of body fluids constitutionally
reasonable.' 0 The Department of Corrections could require an
employee to submit urine samples "only on the basis of reasonable
suspicion, based on specific objective facts and reasonable infer-
ences drawn from those facts in light of experience, that the em-
ployee is then under the influence of alcoholic beverages or con-
trolled substances."' 1 The court also approved urine or blood
46. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Iowa 1984), modified, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir.
1987).
47. Id. at 1126.
48. Id. at 1125.
49. Id. at 1128 (citing Armstrong v. New York State Comm'r of Correction, 545 F. Supp.
728, 730 (N.D.N.Y. 1982)(emphasis in original)).
50. Id. at 1130.
51. Id. (citing Division 241 Amalgamated Transit Union v. Suscy, 538 F.2d 1264 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 1029 (1976)). The court also found that a consent form which
plaintiff had signed upon commencing employment at the prison could not be interpreted as
a consent to an unreasonable search, and that "[aidvance consent to future unreasonable
searches is not a reasonable condition of employment." Id. at 1131 (emphasis in original).
Most recent cases have adopted the reasonable suspicion standard for employees whose
errors have safety implications. See Bostic v. McClendon, 650 F. Supp. 245 (N.D. Ga.
1986)(police officers); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Tenn.
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samples taken as part of routine periodic or preemployment physi-
cal examinations. 52
The Eighth Circuit modified the district court opinion. The
court agreed that urinalysis was a fourth amendment search and
seizure, but pointed out that warrantless searches were acceptable
under the fourth amendment when a legitimate government inter-
est made a privacy intrusion reasonable. Since prisons are
"'fraught with serious security dangers,' ,s the court decided that
the state had a legitimate interest in prison security. The majority
also noted that drug-using employees could smuggle drugs to in-
mates and threaten security, and that drugs could impair prison
employees' ability to handle dangerous guests. 4
The majority concluded that uniform and random testing was
the only way to satisfactorily control employee drug use, and that
urinalysis was the least intrusive method of detection available.
Under this reasoning, the court modified the district court's order
so that prison employees in regular contact with the prisoners
could be tested either "uniformly or by systematic random selec-
tion," so long as selection of urinalysis subjects was not discrimina-
tory or arbitrary. However, employees not in regular contact with
prisoners could be tested only on the basis of reasonable suspicion
that the employees had used controlled substances within twenty-
four hours of the test. 5
Chief Judge Lay, dissenting, would have affirmed the district
court. He recalled judicial approval of persecution of Japanese-
Americans during World War II, and argued that courts should be
loathe to "whittle away basic constitutional rights," lest they later
regret rulings made "in times of hysteria."8 e Judge Lay criticized
the majority's imposition of random testing without factual find-
1986)(firefighters); Penny v. Kennedy, 648 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Tenn. 1986)(police officers);
Capua v. City of Plainsfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986)(police officers and fire fight-
ers); Railway Labor Executives' Associations v. Dole, No. C-85-7958 CAL (N.D. Cal.
1985)(railroad employees). See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Weinberger, 651
F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986)(police officers cannot be tested absent reasonable suspicion).
Compare National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 808 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir. 1987)
(unclear whether reasonable suspicion or probable cause is required for testing of key U.S.
Customs Service employees).
52. McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1132.
53. McDonell, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559
(1979)).
54. McDonell, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987).
55. Id. The court affirmed the district court's imposition of the reasonable cause stan-
dard for strip searches of prison employees.
56. Id. (Lay, C. J., dissenting) (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)).
19871
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ings on the record to prove the institution's real needs. The Chief
Judge concluded that the majority had succeeded only in
"driv[ing] another nail into the coffin of discarded individual con-
stitutional rights.
57
Allen v. City of Marietta" is another recent federal decision val-
idating compelled urinalysis of government employees. After re-
ceiving reports of on-the-job drug use by employees who worked
with high voltage wires and concluding that drug usage may have
contributed to an unusually high number of employee injuries, the
City Manager of Marietta hired an undercover agent to gather in-
formation about worker drug use. After a case was built against the
plaintiffs, they were given the option of submitting to urinalysis or
losing their jobs. All cooperated, tested positive, and were fired. It
was unclear, however, whether these firings were based on the re-
ports of the undercover agent or on the results of the urinalysis
tests."
While recognizing that the employees had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their urine, the court in Allen upheld the urine
tests as reasonable. The court distinguished the government's bur-
den when acting as law enforcer from its burden as an employer.
Although government employees have the same right as private
sector employees to resist warrantless searches, the court held that
the government has the same right as other employers to investi-
gate potential misconduct relevant to the employee's job perform-
ance. Since the search was undertaken in a purely employment
context, not in conjunction with any criminal "investigation, and
since plaintiffs had not been criminally charged as a result of the
investigation, the tests were held valid. The court introduced the
idea that the government as employer has a lesser burden of show-
ing cause than the government as law enforcer.60
57. Id. (Lay, C. J., dissenting).
58. 601 F. Supp. 482 (N.D. Ga. 1985).
59. Id. at 484-485.
60. Id. at 490-491. The court's reasoning in Allen that governmental searches which
would be impermissible if performed by an enforcement branch may be permissible if con-
ducted by a government employer has been criticized. For example, the district court in
McDonell held that such a contention was meritless, and wrote that "[a]ll of us are pro-
tected by the fourth amendment all of the time, not just when police suspect us of criminal
conduct." McDonell, 612 F. Supp. at 1127. But see Capua v. City of Plainsfield, 643 F.
Supp. 1507 (D.N.J. 1986) (employers whose searches possibly could lead to later criminal
prosecutions "must meet a much higher burden of reasonableness" in order for testing to be
allowed).
Regardless of the validity of its employer versus enforcer rationale, the court in Allen
could easily have reached the same conclusion under a reasonable suspicion model by rely-
DRUG TESTING
Turner v. Fraternal Order of Police"1 involved an order of the
District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department permitting
any Department official to order any police officer or fire fighter
suspected of drug use to submit to urinalysis. Police officers and
firefighters could also be ordered to submit to urinalysis at the dis-
cretion of any member of the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons.
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia consid-
ered only the facial constitutionality of the order.62
In balancing the interests of the members of the Department
against those of the government, the court focused on the safety
interests involved. It cited Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway,6 3
which upheld random drug inspections of armed services personnel
conducted without probable cause or any particularized suspicion
that the subjects of the inspections had been using drugs., The
court in Turner described the police force as a "para-military or-
ganization" and concluded that the Department's order was rea-
sonable. The court did mandate that the suspicion or discretion
used to justify testing be based on a "reasonable, objective basis,"
although that basis need not amount to probable cause. 5
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals upheld random urine testing
of race horse jockeys in Shoemaker v. Handel."s Unlike decisions
justifying privacy intrusions as necessary to further governmental
safety interests, the court in Shoemaker held that horse racing, as
a closely regulated industry, fell within an exception to the fourth
amendment warrant requirement and that pervasive regulation
had reduced participants' reasonable expectation of privacy. Fur-
ing on the "extremely hazardous" character of the plaintiff's work, and on the fact that the
city had objective evidence that each of the plaintiffs had been using drugs on the job before
they were asked to provide urine samples. The court mentioned the hazardous work ration-
ale only briefly, in a conclusory manner. Allen, 601 F. Supp. at 491.
61. 500 A.2d 1005 (D.C. 1985).
62. Id. at 1006.
63. 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
64. Id. at 477. The inspections in Callaway did not include urinalysis. The court in Cal-
laway held that conditions peculiar to the military dictated different standards of reasona-
bleness from those in civilian life, and based its decision that the inspections were reasona-
ble on the following factors: (1) drug use diminishes the ability of the armed forces to
protect the country's citizens; (2) a soldier's expectation of privacy is lowered by traditional
inspections and extensive regulation; (3) the purpose of the drug inspections was to protect
the health of the unit, not to punish, although punishment could follow incidental to discov-
ery of drug use; (4) unannounced drug inspections are the best way to identify drug users;
and (5) some measures were taken to guard the dignity and privacy of the soldier. Id. at
476-77.
65. Turner, 500 A.2d at 1008-1009.
66. Shoemaker, 795 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 577 (1986).
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thermore, the court decided that New Jersey had a strong interest
in maintaining public confidence in the integrity of the gambling
industry. This interest was sufficient to override the jockeys' di-
minished expectation of privacy. 67
In McDonell and Shoemaker, circuit courts focused on the drug
problems of particular employee groups rather than on problems of
particular individuals working within those groups. Another recent
federal case, Jones v. McKenzie,6 alluded to the possibility of
testing employees in drug-troubled areas despite the absence of
particularized suspicion of those tested.
In 1984, the Transportation Division of the District of Columbia
School System, charged with busing the District's school children,
noted significant increases in absenteeism and traffic accidents
among Division employees. Syringes and bloody needles had been
found in restrooms used by Division employees. As part of an ef-
fort to alleviate the perceived drug problem, the Division insti-
tuted urinalysis testing of all employees in conjunction with annual
physical examinations. Plaintiff Jones, employed by the Division to
assist handicapped students on and off the bus, was fired when she
tested positive. Prior to testing, the school system had no particu-
larized suspicion that the plaintiff had ever used drugs, on or off
the job."'
The court in Jones found that plaintiff's termination was arbi-
trary and capricious. The court also found that the urinalysis was
an unreasonable search under the fourth amendment, since a
school bus attendant's reasonable expectation of privacy to be free
from random urine testing was not outweighed by the school sys-
tem's safety interest.70 The court did, however, suggest that em-
ployees whose errors had more direct safety implications might be
less protected, in that "school bus drivers or mechanics directly
responsible for the operation and maintenance of school buses
might reasonably expect to be subject to [random] urine and blood
tests .. .
67. Id. at 1142.
68. 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
69. Id. at 1502-03.
70. Jones, 628 F. Supp. at 1508-09.
71. Id. at 1508. At least one other federal court has alluded to more lenient fourth
amendment standards when a problem is shown among a particular group of employees in
safety-threatening positions. In Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga, 647 F. Supp. 875 (E.D.
Tenn. 1986), for example, the court required reasonable suspicion for testing of Chattanooga
fire department employees, but acknowledged the Callaway court's allowance of mass test-
ing for members of the U.S. armed forces. The court in Lovvorn interpreted the Callaway
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It would seem that the overwhelming majority of federal district
courts hold that all public employees have at least some reasonable
expectation of privacy in their urine. Federal decisions generally
have held that one's expectation of privacy is at least partially out-
weighed when it interferes with public safety. If the employer had
some particularized suspicion that the test will yield a positive re-
sult, most courts will allow the state to require urinalysis even in
the absence of probable cause. Both recent decisions of the circuit
courts of appeal allowed random testing. The McDonell court did
so to protect the states' interest in prison security, while the Shoe-
maker court relied on the lowered expectation of privacy of partici-
pants in closely regulated industries.
III. ANALYSIS
Both public and private employers have a legitimate interest in
maintaining a workforce unimpaired by drug use. If state and local
governments did not have to contend with the constitutional rights
of its employees, random urinalysis of all employees would be a
most efficient, cost-effective management tool.72 Fortunately, how-
ever, public employers must act within the confines of the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, and may not conduct unreasonable
searches where employees have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.73
All citizens should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
their urine.7' The whole urinalysis process intrudes on the privacy
and dignity of those tested. Witnesses sometimes actually watch
subjects urinate into vials to prevent employees from submitting
"clean" samples rather than their own urine.7 ' Apart from the in-
dignity involved in the actual testing procedure, urinalysis reveals
decision to allow testing because increases in drug abuse in the armed forces threatens pub-
lic security. The court in Lovvorn found that the city did not show that its fire department
had so threatened the public safety, and implied that fire fighters thus have a greater expec-
tation of privacy than do members of the armed forces. Id. at 882. The court's language,
however, may foreshadow a future ruling favorable to some public employer who could show
that drug use among employees threatened public safety.
72. Unconstitutional searches are often very effective, which "is why King George III's
men so frequently searched the colonists." McDonell v. Hunter, 612 F. Supp. 1122, 1130
(S.D. Iowa 1985).
73. Unfortunately, the fourth amendment applies only to governmental action, so pri-
vate employers may usually test as they please. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees,
AFL-CIO v. Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
74. Capua v. City of Plainsfield, 643 F. Supp. 1507, 1517-18 (D.N.J. 1986).
75. Lovvorn, 647 F. Supp. at 877; Weinberger, 651 F. Supp. 726.
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personal information which has nothing to do with the employee's
performance on the job.76 Finally, a positive result does not prove
that an employee has used drugs recently, or that he has ever used
them to the point of impairment. 7
7
Of course, the government does have the responsibility to pro-
tect its citizens from all illegal drugs, including those used by gov-
ernment employees. Law enforcement branches of government
must adhere to probable cause and warrant restrictions prior to
searching citizens. The question is when, if ever, is the govern-
ment's interest in ferreting out employee drug use sufficient to jus-
tify relaxation of or release from the probable cause standard?
The court in Bauman decided that a city could not employ ran-
dom urinalysis testing under the facts of that case. However, it did
validate testing of individual police officers and fire fighters on a
"reasonable suspicion" showing. A public employer could meet the
reasonable suspicion standard by showing specific facts which, in
light of his experience, led to the conclusion that testing of a par-
ticular employee was necessary. 8
The court's adoption in Bauman of the reasonable suspicion
standard is a valid relaxation of the fourth amendment require-
ment of obtaining a warrant based on probable cause. Most federal
decisions have allowed testing on reasonable suspicion of drug use
by public employees whose human error threatens public safety.
As adopted by the court in Bauman and by the federal courts, the
reasonable suspicion standard facilitates removal of dangerous em-
ployees from safety-threatening positions without subjecting all
employees to the intrusions of random testing.
Despite its overall onerousness, random testing has a valid place
in the public workforce. The government's safety interest out-
weighs the privacy rights of individual workers when there is ob-
jective evidence of drug impairment among a specific group of
workers whose human error poses safety problems. Random testing
should be allowed in these situations to avoid the very real threat
of catastrophic injury. In Jones v. McKenzie, significant increases
in accidents and absenteeism, as well as the discovery of drug par-
aphernalia on work premises in places frequented by Transporta-
tion Division Employees, led school board officials to institute ran-
dom testing.79 The evidence in Jones v. McKenzie may exemplify
76. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
78. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1325.
79. 628 F. Supp. 1500, 1507-08 (D.D.C. 1986).
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the standard of objectivity sufficient to justify random testing of
safety-threatening employees.
Random urinalysis forces dedicated employees to prove their in-
nocence.80 It is unquestionably intrusive and can be justified by
only the most important government interests. When drug-induced
accidents can cause death or bodily injury to others, the worker's
right to be free from urinalysis no longer outweighs the govern-
ment's public safety interests. Further, the reasonable suspicion
standard requires objective evidence, usually in the form of aber-
rant behavior or other evidence of on-the-job drug use. However,
the effects of drug use can remain for some time after manifesta-
tions of impairment have passed.8 1 Random testing, then, would
expose dangerous habits that otherwise would go undetected under
the reasonable suspicion standard. Although some public workers
were found to have a constitutional right in Bauman to stay on the
public payroll, workers whose habits endanger the lives of other
people should be forced to work in less critical areas. The right to
keep a state or municipal job cannot interfere with the right of
others to live in safety.
It should be noted that random testing is advocated only when a
drug problem is shown by objective evidence in a workplace where
human error has safety implications. Applying these criteria to the
facts in Bauman, where prior to testing only two employees were
known to have used drugs in the police and fire departments com-
bined, random testing would not be permitted. Conversely, the
well-documented propensity of Miami police towards drug use and
drug-related corruption 82 might make employees of the Miami Po-
lice Department prime candidates for random testing.
Although no federal court has clearly enunciated this standard
for random testing, support can be drawn from several federal de-
cisions. The court in Jones v. McKenzie ruled against the school
80. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1325.
81. There is growing evidence that off-duty, as well as on-the-job use, is dangerous. A
preliminary study conducted by Stanford University School of Medicine and the Palo Alto
Veterans Administration Medical Center reported that pilots performed at potentially dan-
gerous levels 24 hours after smoking marijuana, after noticeable signs of impairment had
passed. Yesavage, Leirer, Denari & Hollister, Carry-Over Effects of Marijuana Intoxication
on Aircraft Pilot Performance: A Preliminary Report, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1325-29
(1985).
82. Over the past few years, many Miami Police Officers have been fired or arrested for
"everything from drug use to cocaine trafficking." The Miami Herald, March 24, 1987, at
1B, col. 6. Seven current or former Miami police officers are now facing charges of running a
million dollar cocaine ring which resulted in three deaths. The Miami Herald, April 8, 1987,
at 3B, col. 2.
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system in favor of a nonsafety-threatening school bus attendant,
but it opened the door for random testing in situations where a
sufficient safety interest is shown. Presumably because of the
strong evidence of a drug problem among Division employees in-
volved in public safety, the court implied that random testing
might have been permissible had public safety been threatened."s
The circuit court in McDonell allowed random testing of prison
employees who had regular contact with inmates. While the exis-
tence of a drug problem among the prison employees is not clear
from the opinion, the evidence of workplace safety considerations
is undeniable. Moreover, the court in Bauman stated that admit-
ted drug use by two employees did not constitute a "legal spring-
board" sufficient to justify random testing. This implies that there
is some quantum of objective evidence of departmental drug
problems that would have been sufficient to constitute such a "le-
gal springboard."84
At least one writer has proposed that the Bauman decision im-
poses the reasonable suspicion standard for urinalysis testing of all
public employees. This interpretation was based on that portion of
the opinion which "alluded to the high standards of conduct and
job performance that a public employer has the right to expect of
all its employees, not simply police and firefighters."85 Several of
Florida's largest public employers have adopted this blanket inter-
pretation in drafting their own drug policies.88
A fair reading of the Bauman decision can lead only to the con-
clusion that the Fifth District Court of Appeals intended to allow
use of the reasonable suspicion standard for employees in safety-
threatening positions only. In the first place, the final judgment
handed down by the circuit court and modified by the Fifth Dis-
trict was specifically addressed to fire fighters and police officers,
not public employees in general. 7 Secondly, although the decision
83. Jones, 628 F. Supp. 1500 (D.D.C. 1986).
84. Id.
85. Helsby, Drug Testing in the Work Place, FLORIDA B. J. June, 1986, at 74 (emphasis
in original). See also Note, Drug Testing: America's New Work Ethic? 15 STETSON L. REV.
883, 907-08 (1986) (interprets Bauman to apply reasonable suspicion standard to all public
employees). This view apparently is grounded in the trial court's statement, affirmed by the
Fifth District Court of Appeals, that "[public] employees are legitimately subject to more
regulation of their activities than the general populace." Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1324. Com-
pare Committee for GI Rights v. Callaway, 518 F.2d 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (members of the
armed forces are subject to more regulation, so they have a lower expectation of privacy
than civilians).
86. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
87. Bauman, 475 So. 2d at 1325.
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occasionally referred to "employees" rather than "fire fighters and
police officers," the term "employees" was always discussed in the
context of situations involving police officers and fire fighters, or in
policy arguments that could not apply to the public workforce as a
whole.
Finally, the court in Bauman clearly attempted to follow ex-
isting federal case law regarding the reasonable suspicion stan-
dard.88 While many decisions have approved the reasonable suspi-
cion standard for employees in safety-threatening jobs, none have
allowed the imposition of a reasonable suspicion standard on all
public workers. Certainly the court's statement in Bauman that
public employees are subject to more regulation than their private
sector counterparts cannot justify blanket invalidation of the
fourth amendment rights of the public workforce.
If the Bauman decision would allow public employers to subject
all employees to compelled urinalysis on reasonable suspicion, it is
flawed. It is entirely unreasonable to diminish constitutional rights
based solely on the supposed right of the state to expect good per-
formance from its employees. Only the most fundamental interest
in human safety is sufficiently compelling to override the individ-
ual employee's constitutionally protected right to be free from
searches not supported by probable cause. Nonsafety costs of drug
abuse such as theft, absences, accidents, substandard work and
bad public image, should be attacked by government employers
through the same channels used to discipline and discharge those
nondrug-using employees who commit similar offenses.
IV. CONCLUSION
Employee drug use has struck fear in the hearts of America's
private and public employers. Each year, drug-induced human er-
ror costs our economy billions of dollars. The problem is especially
alarming when human error causes injury and death. Random
urinalysis has proven one of the most effective methods for reduc-
ing the number of drug-related accidents. Florida municipal and
state employers have instituted a variety of drug testing policies.
Although private employers apparently may test employees at
will, public employers must operate within the confines of the
fourth amendment. That provision protects citizens from unrea-
88. The majority in Bauman explicitly followed the leading federal cases and noted that
the Florida Constitution provided that its search and seizure provisions should be construed
so as to conform with federal decisions. Id. at 1326 n.1.
19871
120 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:101
sonable governmental searches of areas in which they possess a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Since people have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in their urine, public employers may test
employees only when the state interest furthered by testing out-
weighs the individual's right to be free from such tests.
Searches of areas in which a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy usually are deemed unreasonable unless there is proba-
ble cause that the prospective subject will test positively for illegal
substances. Federal courts generally have relaxed the probable
cause requirement to "reasonable suspicion" when public safety is
implicated, and have in some instances allowed random testing.
The "reasonable suspicion" standard is met when an employer has
a particularized suspicion that a certain employee will test positive
for illegal substance use.
Illegal drugs threaten our society. Still, media hype and public
outcry should not pressure courts into abandoning constitutional
protections. Public employees occupying nonsafety-related jobs
should enjoy full fourth amendment rights, and should not be sub-
jected to unwarranted testing. Public employers can deal with ab-
senteeism, incompetency, employee theft, and other common em-
ployment problems without engaging in constitutionally repugnant
witch hunts.
However, the public employee's right to be free from urinalysis
is overridden by the right of others to live in safety. When public
safety is threatened by an objectively proven drug problem, em-
ployees may have to choose between the right to keep a dangerous
job and the right to avoid forced urine tests.
The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal recognized this dis-
tinction in City of Palm Bay v. Bauman. The court in Bauman
held that municipal police officers and fire fighters ordinarily could
not be subjected to random urinalysis, but indicated that testing
based on reasonable suspicion would be allowed. The best reading
of the case permits reasonable suspicion testing of employees in
safety-threatening positions only.
In addition, random testing should be allowed when a drug prob-
lem is shown to exist among a specific group of public employees
whose human error has safety-threatening implications. While ran-
dom testing was not necessary under the Bauman facts, public em-
ployers should not be forced to wait until catastrophe strikes to
identify the source of a problem known to exist. Where safety-
threatening problems are shown, the government's interest in pro-
tecting the public outweighs the privacy right of workers. This in-
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terest warrants compelling employees in safety-threatening jobs ei-
ther to submit to testing or to transfer to less dangerous public
positions.
Win. Andrew Hamilton

